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Developments in epistemology are philosophically interesting for two reasons. The 
first is simply that they are advancements in the analysis of a core set of concepts—
knowledge, belief, truth, and reason. Getting clear about these things is important, 
just as we should be interested in getting clear about justice, the moral good, beauty, 
and meaning. These are concepts that reflective humans want to possess and use 
correctly. They are part of our normative lives, and so we do better when we are 
right about the concepts and their applications. The second reason why 
epistemology is philosophically interesting is that developments in our account of 
knowledge influence how we pursue our other philosophical accounts. So, one’s 
story of why one is right about, say, justice (and how others may be wrong) is one 
that depends on one’s account of what it is to be right about these concepts and how 
one can demonstrate that. Epistemology, then, is not only of first-order 
philosophical interest, but it is of concern for second-order philosophical reasons. 
Views on the nature of truth and the acquisition of knowledge bear on how one sees 
the breadth of philosophically relevant truths and the methods of one’s competitors. 
This point about the two levels of philosophical import for epistemology is 
borne out in the way the transition from mythology to philosophy is discussed when 
demarcating the beginnings of the ancient philosophical traditions. The relevant 
transition from the complex of Hesiodic and Homeric poems to philosophical 
historia is posited on the contrast between reliance on testimony given about the 
gods or through those inspired by them and those who judge by reason and 
experience. Hesiod’s Theogony opens with the poet relating how he met the nymphs 
who tell him the stories of the gods and have given him the ability to relate them 
accurately (Theog. 22-35), and Homer’s two epics open with an appeal to the goddess 
to speak through the poet, and, by extension, the rhapsode relating the poem (Il. I.1-
3; Od. I.1-10). The philosophical tradition is demarcated by a transition to human 
capacities to reflect upon and endorse the truths on offer. Xenophanes’ critique of 
the revealed religious traditions concedes that independent inquiry does not 
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guarantee success, but we nevertheless ‘discover better’ with inquiry, as opposed to 
not inquiring (B 18), and Heraclitus explicitly criticizes the poetic tradition’s hold 
on the minds of Greeks: “Heraclitus said Homer deserved to be expelled from the 
contests and flogged, and Archilochus likewise” (B 42). The contrast between the 
two traditions is clearest in the opening lines of Parmenides’ poem, where the poet 
is brought up to speak with the goddess, but is given a directive: “judge by reasoning 
(logos) the much-contested examination spoken by me” (B 7). Parmenides’ 
philosophical program may be put into a poem, like those of the epic traditions 
beforehand, but the validity of its contents is one to be evaluated on the merits of its 
arguments, not on the divinity of its source.  
Developments in epistemology and developments in philosophical method 
are tightly connected for the ancients. With Plato, for example, the myth of 
recollection in the Meno is both an answer to a crypto-skeptical challenge, but it is 
also a description of how Socrates’ method is supposed to work more generally 
(Meno 86b and Phaedo 99d). Aristotle’s commitment to saving the appearances is 
both a commitment to the manifest image and a stand against the reductivism of 
many of his predecessors, but it is also the statement of his broader philosophical 
strategy of answering most philosophical competitors (See NE VII. 1145b.3-8 and 
Met I. 985a.10-17). Beyond the classical period, this point is borne out with the 
Epicurean kanon and the injunction that philosophical reflection not extend beyond 
what is supported by the senses (Ep. Herod., 38). The Stoics required that the sophos 
never err, so they restrict all judgment to those based on kataleptic impressions—
namely, impressions that are true, caused by what is, and are distinctive in a way 
that marks them from false impressions (DL 7.47). The combination of the high 
standards for rational belief and the conflict over the proper criterion for the correct 
standards yielded the Academic and later Pyrrhonian skepticisms about both the 
possibility of knowledge and philosophical achievement overall (Ac 1.44 and PH 
1.12).  
The point of this quick overview is simply to portray the philosophical 
fecundity of epistemology. I think the ancients are exemplary in this respect, since 
with their exchanges about these respective philosophies of knowledge, they see that 
they are, by extension, offering critique of groundings for theories of justice, the 
moral good, beauty, and meaning. The essays in this volume bear out the broad 
consequences of the epistemic program in and between the figures prominent in 
ancient philosophy—views about the gods and their role in the human realm, 
accounts of the proper criterion for coordinating conflicting moral norms, what role 
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contemplation plays in a complete life, how widely the critical eye of skepticism 
ranges, and what one should do when that skeptical eye lands upon oneself, are all 
at their core epistemological questions, but they have practical and 
metaphilosophical consequences.  
Harald Thorsrud’s “Sextus Empiricus on the Siren Song of Reason and the 
Skeptical Defense of Ordinary Life” is a case that, from the Pyrrhonist’s perspective, 
reason’s deceptive influence is not merely an epistemic problem, but a practical 
challenge for reflective beings. Inquirers, like sailors captivated by the Sirens’ song, 
yearn for truth and knowledge. Sextus holds that both the sirens and reason offer 
only empty promises, ones that bring ruin to those who follow them. Neither 
knowledge nor the tranquility promised by its pursuit come from this path. The 
skeptical view that the dogmatic programs neither provide knowledge nor yield 
tranquility yet seems a product of reason, too. But, as Thorsrud notes, the history of 
sophisms shows reason to be a trickster, stealing appearances from us, as we see with 
the rationalist traditions of denying motion, time, and the phenomenal world. The 
skeptic’s skill, then (as noted at PH I.9) is not simply opposing appearances to reasons 
in any fashion, but in opposing those reasonings, undoing their hold on our minds. 
This, Thorsrud argues, is Sextus’ therapeutic conclusion, one that undoes the effects 
of philosophical dogmatizing.  
Timothy Roche’s essay, “The Practical Life, the Contemplative Life, and the 
Perfect Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 10.7-8” provides a defense of 
an interpretation that differs from previous readings of Aristotle’s final remarks 
about happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics. Roche argues that Aristotle’s final 
discussion of eudaimonia is not, as some have alleged, inconsistent with Aristotle’s 
claims about happiness in the previous 9 books of the Ethics. Moreover, it is not an 
exclusively ‘intellectualist,’ ‘inclusive end,’ ‘superstructure,’ or ‘approximation’ 
account as others have maintained. Rather, understanding Aristotle’s notions of the 
perfect eudaimonia and secondary (or second-rank) eudaimonia in EN 10 begins 
with the consideration that the secondary eudaimonia is not a life typified by any or 
every sort of excellent practical activity, but one typified by a specific type of 
excellent practical activity, namely excellent political activity. Once this is point is 
acknowledged, Roche argues that (1) for Aristotle, the perfect eudaimonia involves 
not only the exercise of theoretical wisdom, but excellent practical activity as well, 
(2) the contemplative life does not, and cannot, involve the type of excellent 
practical activity equivalent to excellent political activity, but nonetheless (3) some 
of the philosopher’s happiness consists in a particular form of excellent practical 
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activity, namely, the form of excellent practical activity exercised within the 
contemplative person’s personal or private life, the life he lives with family, friends, 
and associates. Consequently, the perfect eudaimonia for Aristotle is not composed 
exclusively of contemplative activity (as intellectualist interpreters claim). And even 
though contemplative activity is the primary component of the philosopher’s 
perfectly happy life, Aristotle holds that excellent practical activity makes a direct 
contribution to the philosopher’s happiness. It does so not because happiness is 
inclusive of all intrinsic goods or because excellent practical activity is an 
approximation of the exercise of theoretical wisdom, but precisely for the reason 
Aristotle himself gives—the philosopher is a human being, a being whose most 
distinctive activity is practical in nature. The secondary eudaimonia, by contrast, 
involves the life of the practically wise and morally excellent statesman, and so on 
Roche’s interpretation, the happiness found in both the contemplative life and the 
political life necessarily (though in the contemplative life only partially), consists in 
practically wise and morally excellent activities. 
Maureen Eckert’s “Euthyphro and the Logic of Miasma” is an account of the 
conflicted state of religious and moral knowledge in classical Athens. Eckert holds 
that this conflict is in high resolution in Plato’s Euthyphro. In particular, it is in the 
puzzle case of Euthyphro prosecuting his own father for murder. Eckert argues that 
Euthyphro is on good ground from one perspective in holding that the pollution of 
a murder must be extirpated, but his case is complicated by the fact that to proceed, 
a son must prosecute his own father, which breaks with norms of filial piety. And 
so, the systems of purity and pollution conflict with that of honor and shame. Surely 
only one with the highest expertise in religion and morality would venture to take 
a strong stand in such a conflicted case, and Euthyphro famously claims that he 
certainly has it, or else “I should be of no use… and Euthyphro would not be superior 
to the majority of all men” (5a). It seems that in Euthyphro’s’ case, like the case of 
conflict between two models of justice in Aeschylus’s Oresteia, it is not so easily 
arbitrated. In fact, given the way the conflict is portrayed in both Plato’s Euthyphro 
and Aeschylus’s Eumenides (the third of the three in the Oresteia trilogy), any of 
the decisions will have significant difficulty being seen as legitimate by opponents. 
Here, Eckert holds that the Athenian legal system would need an independent 
conception of pollution and piety to break the intellectual conflict. The problem, 
though, is that for Euthyphro, Athena does not arrive deus ex machina to resolve 
the tension between the sets of norms, as she does for Orestes in the Oresteia. As 
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Eckert assesses the situation, “[as] long as the legal system is intertwined with 
religion, nothing can be settled.”  
Allysson V.L. Rocha’s “Boundless Skepticism and the Five Modes” makes the 
case that a form of general skepticism is derivable from the interplay between two 
themes in Sextus Empiricus’s Five Modes. In general, the skeptic’s arguments are 
either dialectically tied to their interlocutors, or they are not. If they are tied to their 
interlocutors, the skeptical conclusions do not risk self-refutation, but they will not 
yield general conclusions—they are only bad consequences for particular views 
about knowledge. If the skeptical arguments are not dialectically tied, they are more 
general, freestanding, skeptical conclusions. But they then risk the problem of self-
refutation, as it seems the skeptic proves something with the arguments and the 
skeptic must have done so with a background theory of knowledge. Rocha’s solution 
is to use Sextus’ dialectical tropes as a model for more general conclusions. What 
Rocha calls the subjective constraints of interpretation—that the skeptical modes are 
applied only to topics that individual skeptics are investigating—is how to stay true 
to the dialectical orientation of Sextus’ skepticism. However, the modes themselves 
can be applied to whatever it is said about the subject the individual skeptic attends 
to, and so, even if one is constrained by context for any particular suspension, these 
are instances of a more general pattern, identified by the Five Modes as a technique 
for skeptical challenge. The consequence, as Rocha takes it, is that skepticism is 
limited by the context of use and the interests of the skeptics who practice 
skepticism’s strategies, but this is because the Five Modes, as types of arguments, are 
more general than their limited range of individual tokens.  
Daniel Larkin’s “A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato’s Late 
Dialogues” is a case for centralizing divine inspiration in the theories of knowledge 
on display in Plato’s later dialogues, such as the Laws, Sophist, and Philebus. 
Importantly, the role of inspiration in the early and middle dialogues is quite 
familiar—Socrates has a daimon, the kalliopolis of the Republic follows the dictates 
of the Delphic Oracles, and the doctrine of recollection of the Meno is one revealed 
by ‘priests and priestesses’ giving an account of their practice. Larkin’s argument is 
that divine inspiration plays a similar role in the later dialogues, but this role is 
unique in that the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist and Statesman and the Athenian 
of the Laws integrate reported divine sources of knowledge into their epistemic and 
political programs. In the Laws, the poets are hailed as divinely inspired, so they can 
be reliable for their histories. In the Philebus, Socrates regularly appeals to the gods 
for help in deploying his method—in this case, of collection and division (18b). 
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Socrates further announces that the gods sent him to keep inquiry alive among 
humans (Philebus 20b), and he reports that the question of the dialogue (namely, 
whether pleasure alone is a good) was revealed by the gods, too. Larkin concludes 
that Socrates’ wisdom (and the wisdom required to efficiently run a state), even in 
the later dialogues, is in large part a product of divine dispensation.  
Brian Ribeiro argues for a radically skeptical interpretation of Cicero’s 
philosophy of religion, what he identifies as an early form of orthopraxic skeptical 
fideism. The skeptical fideist tradition, associated with Montaigne, Pascal, and Bayle 
as its early modern proponents, has many plausible ancient antecedents. Socratic 
claims of ignorance combined with Socrates’ stories of what is revealed to him by 
religious resources (e.g., the Delphic Oracle, recommendations of his daimon, 
reports from religious practitioners about the journey of souls before and after life) 
is a tempting example. However, Ribeiro is reticent to attribute a full-throated 
skepticism to Socrates, instead more an inquiring attitude. Alternately, Cicero’s 
Cotta in De Natura Deorum, representing the skeptical Academy in critical exchange 
with Stoic and Epicurean theologies, counts easily as a skeptic. And Cotta, further, 
is an enthusiastic participant in Roman religion—in fact, he’s a pontifex (a keeper of 
sacred rights and official of state religious ceremonies). Ribeiro’s view, then, is that 
Cotta, as a skeptic, holds that though religion’s doxastic commitments do not pass 
critical scrutiny, its practical benefits are still worth pursuing and worth the 
preservation of the institutions of ceremony. And so, though a skeptic, Ribeiro holds, 
Cotta is still committed to the orthopraxy of his Roman civic religion. He is, as 
Ribeiro terms him, an Academic pontifex.  
Andrew Cling argues that Meno’s Paradox is an instance of the problem of the 
regress of reasons. The regress problem arises in this particular case of Meno’s 
challenge by the requirement that all knowledge-about something requires prior 
knowledge of what that thing is. The regress, then, is one for knowledge acquisition, 
and so it is primarily a problem for going from not knowing anything about 
something to knowing something about it. If we assume that our knowledge is the 
product of learning and inquiry (coming to know from ignorance), then it seems that 
knowledge is impossible. Given this presentation of the regress arising from 
knowledge-acquisition, the Platonic solution of nativism (that acquisition is only an 
illusion—we are actually recollecting these things) is a clear answer to the challenge. 
Given that this puzzle is stated as a version of the problem of the transition from 
non-being to being, Cling identifies an Eleatic influence in the background—that 
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Plato’s anti-skeptical theory of knowledge is an expression of a deeper Eleatic 
rationalism. 
